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Abstract 
Discourses are more than just patterns of words. For discourse communities, they express ideologies and provide meanings 
that can be translated into action. They are vehicles for reform when they thrive. The discourse of person-centered medicine 
has had a vigorous start, with identifiable leaders, a vocabulary which has situated meanings, institutions such as meetings, 
letterheads and a Society and a group of adherents that constitute a discourse community. For a discourse to thrive, its 
founding problematic has to be perceived as 'real' by its target audience — in this case, presumably, healthcare workers. Real 
in this sense can be defined as something perceived to have an influence on foundational values, for better or for worse. It is 
not yet clear that the discourse of person-centered medicine has convinced its target audience of the 'crisis of knowledge, 
care, compassion and costs' that it invokes to justify its proposed paradigm shift. In order to make it thrive, those who drive 
the discourse will need to 'realise' both the crisis it addresses and the outcomes it may achieve. 
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Introduction 
Person-centered medicine has rapidly become - among 
other things - a name for a discourse, where a discourse is 
taken to be a structured use of language with situated 
meanings, embodying an ideology, together with symbols 
and acts which translate the ideology into the real-world of 
interaction [1-4]. In other words, a discourse is a way of 
talking, a way of thinking and a way of acting that puts the 
talking and thinking into action. Medicine is a discourse; 
so is quilting or cricket, law or journalism. Each discourse 
has its vocabulary, values, displays and ways of acting. 
The word 'shock' will evoke widely different meanings 
and responses when used by family and friends, doctors, 
electricians, seismologists and military tacticians. Each 
group represents a discourse community that shares 
meanings, understandings and learned responses. 
Discourses can be expert or Type 1 (such as evidence-
based medicine or equity law), public or Type 2 (such as 
the war on terrorism) or discourses about discourses Type 
3 (such as critical discourse about evidence-based 
medicine (EBM)). Person-centered medicine, for this 
discussion, can be treated as a Type 1 sub-discourse 
situated within a much larger Type 1 discourse of medicine 
generally. Discourses in cultures, societies and groups 
intersect with one another and draw terms and meanings 
from one another. Their overall structure resembles a 
sponge, with the cavities of various sizes representing 
discourses and discourse communities, surrounded by and 
communicating with the other cavities. 
All discourses have characteristic evolution in similar 
stages over different timescales. This pattern has been 
described elsewhere [3-7]. Discourses begin with a 
founding problematic, which provides them with their 
initial energy. A problematic is not the same as a problem. 
It consists of a problem or problem-set and the discourse 
used at a particular time to address it. A discourse is 
commonly driven by an ideology l  and it defines meanings, 
1 
Ideology is used here in the neutral or descriptive sense (Geuss, R. (1982)). The 
Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press) of a 'style of thought' common to a group with similar 
interests, or a system of symbols that encodes the group's common interests (Geertz, 
C. (1964). Ideology as a Cultural System. Ideology and Its Discontents. D. E. Apter, 
Free Press of Glencoe: (47-76). It avoids the pejorative and positive uses examined 
by Geuss (1982). 
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ways of talking and acting in relation to the problem. 
Hartwig [8] defines it thus: 
A problematic is the structured field constituted by 
philosophies, philosophical traditions, theories, etc., 
within which alone meaningful questions can be asked 
or problems posed. It will screen out or occlude some 
questions and problems [9]. 
Althusser, in one of the early clarifications of the 
problematic, wrote: 
What actually distinguishes the concept of the 
problematic...is that it brings out...the system of 
questions commanding the answers given by the 
ideology. If the meaning of an ideology's answers is to 
be understood at this internal level it must first be asked 
the question of its questions...it is not the interiority of 
the problematic which constitutes its essence but its 
relations to real problems... (italicisation on original) 
EBM, for example, began with a recognition that only 
a minority of medical interventions could be justified by 
numerical data and that this shortcoming needed to be 
corrected by privileging certain kinds of evidence in order 
to enhance medicine's claims to 'scientific' status. This 
combination of problem and projected response constituted 
EBM's problematic. 
Those who first define the problematic become 
leaders, who attract followers to form the initial discourse 
community [1,7,10]. Discourse communities produce texts 
which define particular terms (such as 'evidence') in 
particular ways that confer on them specific situated 
meanings. These texts may be spoken or written. 
Particularly influential writings become iconic texts (such 
as those by Guyatt and colleagues on EBM [11]). At the 
same time, the discourse community and its leaders 
develop master narratives that tell the interpreted story of 
the discourse's evolution. EBM's master narrative could be 
abbreviated thus: 
`It begins when a few mindful leaders perceive the 
weakness of having too little evidentiary support for 
dangerous and expensive modes of treatment; it grows 
because this weakness is perceived as real by many 
medical practitioners and policy makers; it grows 
rapidly into an influential movement in medicine, 
changes attitudes to practice, spins off associations, 
journals, medical teaching and justification. It has its 
detractors, but is resilient enough to provide answers to 
their criticisms, to continue to flourish and exert 
influence. It survives because its cause is just and 
sensible people can see that its justification is self-
evident.' 
Successful discourses also thrive because they 
translate words into action. They offer opportunities to 
people who join the discourse community. EBM offered a 
framework that allowed researchers and policy makers to 
speak in particular ways in medical journals and at 
meetings. The Cochrane Collaboration became a public 
face for EBM. Like all discourse communities, EBM 
offered a sense of belonging to those who subscribed to the  
discourse and generated a sense of exclusion directed 
toward critics. 
All discourses generate responses that reinforce or 
transform them reflexively. Universities offer courses in 
EBM and healthcare workers pay to attend those courses. 
The University of Oxford, for example, (see 
www.cebm.net) currently offers a five-day course in 
Teaching Evidence-based Practice for £1200. Someone 
who attended a previous course left a comment that reads: 
The plenaries were outstanding, participant's level and 
enthusiasm was superb. I am taking away a lot of ideas 
and tools to apply to my setting. Every moment was 
well spent both academically and socially. 
The academic rewards and sense of belonging to a 
discourse community emerge strongly. The 'ideas and 
tools' earn respect and the writer expects concrete results 
and improvements in teaching when they are applied in his 
or her particular setting. Successful discourses lead to 
changes and reforms. They lead also to critiques and the 
critiques lead to dialectic that often modifies the original 
discourse. In the case of EBM, counter-discourses (see, for 
example, [12-23]), have meant that the early privileging of 
numerical data [24-26] has had to be softened so that 
experience and informed professional opinion can be 
included in the hierarchy of levels of evidence [27-29]. 
EBM has survived in part because it has been prepared to 
compromise, to allow back into its fold the kinds of 
evidence that it initially criticized and rejected. 
Whether they succeed in producing reform or wither 
under the influence of critiques, discourses are subject to a 
form of entropy [30-35]. The initial energy stalls under the 
weight of argument and the labour of justification, unless 
new negentropy comes from finding new problems to 
manage. EBM has confronted its critics and managed to re-
energise its discourse by changing its criteria for evidence 
and by continuing to demonstrate contentious and 
important results (see, for example, [36]). Mao Tse Dung 
(following Trotsky) recognised the importance of 
negentropy when he advocated "perpetual revolution" [37], 
knowing that revolutions ran out of energy with time and 
the achievement of original purpose. Mature discourses 
need the energising effect of challenges and the means and 
will to meet them. 
Humanising discourse in medicine 
Person-centered medicine is the latest in a long succession 
of discourses that have sought to deal with the humanistic 
aspects of healthcare. The received form of the Hippocratic 
oath, for example, takes a realistic view of human nature, 
enjoining the physician not only to act compassionately 
and professionally toward the patient, but also to rise 
above common humanity and avoid sexual opportunism in 
the practice of healing. The Oath of Maimonides calls for 
the physician to consider the patient always as a fellow 
human in pain. Osler wanted physicians to be broadly 
cultured and widely read, so that they could bring greater 
awareness and sensitivity to clinical practice [38]. The 
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bioethics movement suggests that ethical thinking will 
bring clinical practice to a new and reflective level, while 
protecting people from paternalistic exploitation [40-42]. 
EBM itself has claimed that ethical practice is practice 
supported by evidence [11,18,19,22,23,42,46,47]. Humane 
medicine seems to have come and gone as the name for a 
discourse [48-50]. Patient-centered care is still active [51-
55], whereas narrative medicine seems to be declining [56-
60]. Epstein's mindful practice remains influential [61,62]. 
Values-based medicine is still little more than a proto-
discourse [63-69]. Much energy seems now to be invested 
in person-centered medicine [70-72]. This is the new 
discourse in a long line of discourses designed for reform. 
What brings all these movements under one rubric of 
(re)humanising medicine? First, they have all asked, in 
their different ways, for clinicians to value certain virtues, 
such as wisdom, equanimity, kindness, concern, respect 
and empathy. Second, they have suggested that clinicians 
should act in certain ways, adopting behaviours 
appropriate to the settings of illness, bearing themselves 
with dignity, listening respectfully and responding to the 
illness narrative with insight and understanding. Third, 
there has been an emphasis on human breadth, on wisdom 
[73] and the cultural sensitivity that has been linked to 
knowledge of the humanities. Latin and Greek were once 
pre-requisites for entry to a medical course. Osler [38] 
encouraged his students to read the classics and medical 
humanities courses are more commonly joined to more 
scientific medical teaching. So there is nothing new in our 
crisis of medicine, nor are the contemporary discourses 
picking up on problems without precedent. 
Do they reflect real failings? And who should define 
those failings? There is a long history of sociologists, 
philosophers and thoughtful physicians seeking to find 
inconsistencies, weaknesses and outright failings in the 
practice of medicine and in its philosophy, without 
achieving a Kuhnian paradigm change [74]. There is a 
message here that has to do with the object of discourse. 
Several different entities seem to fall under the reforming 
critiques. These are, for instance, the philosophy of 
medicine, the health system, the delivery of care and the 
attitudes and conduct of individual healthcare practitioners. 
Much of the re-humanising discourse is meant to be 
therapy for public dissatisfaction with and distrust in 
`medicine', but it is not always clear whether the reform is 
designed to fix medicine's philosophy, practice, systems or 
practitioners. This is the more challenging because what is 
known about public perceptions of 'medicine' and doctors 
suggests a relatively even persistence of quite high trust 
and satisfaction, at least in Western countries see, for 
example, [75-77] (http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpub  
rlications/researcharchive/2818/Doctors-are-most-trusted-
profession-politicians-least-trusted.aspx). And interviews 
with doctors suggest that they already value humane 
feelings and behaviours in significant ways and are quick 
to condemn the insensitive or selfish behaviour of 
colleagues. They have a good appreciation of what 
constitutes good and bad behaviour [78,79]. 
There is, however, evidence that supports public and 
medical dissatisfaction with the systems that are supposed 
to deliver healthcare in a number of Western countries  
[78,80]. Our own work suggests that doctors are 
dissatisfied because of perceived mismatches between the 
fundamental humanity of medicine and the constraints that 
the medical system places on medical practice, between the 
possibilities of technology and the rationing that constrains 
those possibilities. Sen's capabilities approach [81] is an 
illuminating way to examine illness, disability and 
disadvantage. It is equally useful in illuminating the 
frustrations that follow the denial of the capabilities of 
doctors. 
Some discourses, like that of EBM, achieve 
considerable market penetration and drive paradigm 
change. Others appear, gain some following and then 
decline entropically within a relatively short time. They 
dwindle for various reasons — they may simply be wrong 
(focal sepsis); their success eliminates the founding 
problem (tuberculosis eradication in Australia) or the 
founding problematic is not seen to be 'real' by too many 
members of the target audience (narrative medicine). 
But what does 'real' mean in the context of a 
discourse? Thomas and Thomas [82] talked about the 
perceived 'reality' of any situation that a person 
encountered and it is clear from the context of their famous 
proposition that they construed reality to imply the 
situation's capacity to influence the survival, security or 
flourishing of others — at least in the assessment of 
someone involved in the situation. The Thomases' own 
words clarify what they meant (p. 572): 
To take an extreme example, the warden of 
Dannemora prison recently refused to honor the order of 
the court to send an inmate outside the prison walls for 
some specific purpose. He excused himself on the 
grounds that the man was too dangerous. He had killed 
several persons who had the unfortunate habit of talking 
to themselves on the street. From the movement of their 
lips he imagined they were calling him vile names and 
he behaved as if this was true. If men define situations 
as real, they are real in their consequences. 
The total situation will always contain more and 
less subjective factors and the behaviour reaction can 
only be studied in connection with the whole context, 
that is, the situation as it exists in verifiable, objective 
terms and as it has seemed to exist in terms of the 
interested persons. 
The warden of the prison acted on the precautionary 
principle, perceiving the real risks to others of allowing the 
distorted reality of the prisoner back onto the streets. 
Reality, in such a context and in the context of an evolving 
discourse, emerges from the joint perceptions of a potential 
discourse community that there exists a possibility of 
benefit or harm to the foundational values that they hold 
and may consider themselves to hold on behalf of others. 
There is an axiom that I would like to propose about 
evolving discourses: A discourse community will only 
thrive if the founding problematic is perceived as real. An 
example of a discourse whose founding problematic was 
soon recognised to be 'unreal' is Fletcherism, a doctrine 
proposed by Horace Fletcher [83] that aging could be 
reversed and health preserved by the meticulous and 
thorough mastication of food, including fluids. Fletcherism 
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enjoyed support from eminent people and enjoyed a 
fashion for about 15 years, but its appeal fell away because 
its rationale was precarious, its benefits inobvious and 
other dietary fads (such as calorie counting) seemed more 
appealing. In other words, the founding problematic was 
not real enough to sustain the discourse against 
competition. The founding problem of aging may be real, 
but the discourse of mastication lacked logical connection 
and convincing outcomes. Entropy was too strong for 
negentropy, because the answer encapsulated by the 
discourse was not seen to be a real answer. The perceived 
`reality' of a problematic depends on the extent to which 
the emergent discourse catalyses understanding and action 
that meet the challenges of the defining problems. 
The discourse of person-centered 
medicine 
Person-centered medicine seems to have all the attributes 
of a successful discourse. It has effective, informed, 
committed and energetic leaders. And the number of 
followers is rapidly increasing, so that a clearly identifiable 
discourse community is already present. The discourse 
community is producing plenty of text in its journal and at 
its meetings. Iconic texts and master narratives are readily 
available. It has its own offices, Society and letterhead. It 
has started with great energy. And it has set out to define 
its founding problems with clarity. 
How 'real' is its founding problematic? Miles and 
Mezzich [71] and Miles and Loughlin [70] write of the 
crisis confronting 'medicine' — 'a crisis of knowledge, 
compassion, care and costs - ...which risks a grave 
outcome for patients and clinicians alike.' Miles and 
Mezzich also write of the 'rise of scientific medicine and 
the advent of depersonalisation', citing particularly the 
writings of Francis Peabody from 1927 [84]. They are not 
explicit, however, about the locus of depersonalisation, 
whether it refers to medicine's philosophy or education, its 
systems of practice, its involvement in care, to its 
practitioners or perhaps to all of these. Yet we have already 
seen that the perceptions of patients and doctors in general 
do not single out all these failings as 'realities' demanding 
immediate remedies. There is considerable agreement in 
our own work between patients and doctors that the 
bureaucratised systems of healthcare diminish the 
capabilities of doctors to deliver optimal care and to 
behave virtuously in each clinical context. But that is a 
long way from proving that doctors — a major part of the 
target audience for the discourse of person-centered 
medicine — perceive person-centered medicine as the best 
answer to the shortcomings of medicine, whatever 
medicine is taken to mean in that particular context. There 
may be a crisis of compassion and knowledge, but what 
draws comment from patients and doctors are the 
shortcomings of systems and of particular practitioners 
rather than 'medicine' in general. Person-centered 
medicine's promise of attention to issues of equity within 
and between countries and socio-economic groups is one 
of its most attractive features. Global inequity in the 
availability and delivery of healthcare is inarguable. The  
crisis of costs, both nationally and internationally, is 
certainly seen as real by practitioners and as part of the 
discrepancy between the potential to provide the full range 
of possible services and the actuality of rationing, but 
person-centered medicine will not solve the 'ethonomic' 
[85] issues of healthcare. It might teach public and 
practitioners to step back from the technological and 
institutional imperatives and re-categorise (in a Kantian 
sense) the imperative of care, but such a turnaround would 
take much persuasion and much time. 
The discourse of person-centered medicine, like all its 
humanising kindred, will flourish if — and only if — it can 
discursively 'realise' its problematic. It needs to work with 
a consistent basis that avoids internal contradiction. It 
needs better definitions of the concepts of its basic 
philosophy, including such essentials as personhood, anti-
foundationalism and emergence, 3 fundamental terms in its 
discourse. It would also benefit from much clearer 
evidence for the specific shortcomings that it proposes to 
redress and from a more conscious matching of the 
discourse to shortcomings that the target audience perceive 
as real. To convince Western doctors, weary of repeated 
injunctions to better their attitudes, behaviour, 
achievements, communications and economic 
responsibility, the discourse needs to define criteria for 
success that mean something to the target audience. And it 
will need to define programs of education, monitoring and 
ways of demonstrating better outcomes (however defined). 
Measures of compliance with person-centered medicine's 
guidelines will certainly not be enough. There is early 
evidence that patient-centered and person-centered care 
can improve outcomes for some kinds of patient within 
Western healthcare [86-88]. Even that has not allowed 
either to become a new paradigm for medical practice. 
Person-centered medicine will need to do much more than 
provide an appealing theoretical rationale for medical 
practice. 
There is still uncertainty about the ability of 
educational programs to change doctors' attitudes, 
behaviours, communications and practices and about the 
effects of all these things on patients [89,90]. There is just 
as much doubt about the possibility of teaching wisdom 
[23,91] and it seems that wisdom in 'medicine' and its 
practitioners is a virtue sought by many reform movements 
[73,92-97] — and also by current practitioners [79]. And 
there is reason to believe that the endless formulation of 
guidelines, rules and other quasi-legal substitutes for 
ethical intuitions and moral standards will lead to a 
decrease, rather than an increase, in humankind's moral 
reasoning abilities [98]. 
Conclusion 
Kant famously wrote that 'out of wood so crooked and 
perverse as that which man is made of, nothing absolutely 
straight can ever be wrought' [99]. Doctors, patients, 
families, administrators, economists, policymakers, 
philosophers, politicians — we are all humans and persons 
and imperfect. Aspirations for reform are always worth 
following and to the making of discourses there is no end. 
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But as Garvin [100] wrote in 1953, "Norms or ideals or 
values that are not held, that don't become peoples' 
interests, will be peculiarly valueless, no matter what 
inherent validity they may possess." I would like to be a 
member of the discourse community of person-centered 
medicine, but I would also like to be a member of a 
discourse community that sets paradigms and shows that 
those paradigms matter - shows, in short, that they will 
provide the foundations for the amelioration of real 
shortcomings in whatever parts of contemporary medicine 
are actually failing. 
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